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"TAXNAPPING": HOW MURPHY V. IRS USED DIRECT TAXATION TO
STEAL THE TAX REFORM DEBATE
Jason A. Derr*
ABSTRACT
Suppose someone asks you, "You know, I'm fed up with the tax policy of the
United States, what can I do to change it?" Although some may respond with ideas
of protest, one of the most common responses will likely be, "Call your Congress-
person." However, after the D.C. Circuit's decision in Murphy v. IRS, a new re-
sponse is offered. If you want to change tax policy, "call the judge's chambers."
In Murphy v. IRS, decided in 2007, the D.C. Circuit considered whether the
taxation of emotional injury damages violated the "direct tax clauses" of the United
States Constitution. The direct clauses are a mysterious pair of clauses that were
never defined in the Constitution, made even more complex by early Supreme
Court case law, and have since been ignored by the Court for over 70 years. It was
1934 when the Supreme Court last addressed the issue of direct taxation, and since
that date, there is still no clear answer to the question, "What is a 'direct tax?"'
Murphy's direct tax analysis was a complicated mess of precedent. The court's
application of stare decisis is internally inconsistent. Additionally, the court's
analysis contradicts Supreme Court case law and some of the major originalist in-
terpretations of the direct tax clauses.
By confusing the law on direct taxation, the D.C. Circuit has put fundamental
income tax reform in jeopardy. Any shift from the current federal income tax to a
"flat tax" or a "FairTax" may raise the constitutional issue of whether such a tax is
a "direct tax." Since Murphy leaves the law open-ended, anyone who objects to
such tax reform can use the federal courts to stop Congress from reforming the
income tax. When a judicial decision steals the tax policy debate away from the
legislature, they have committed "taxnapping," a term defined for the first time in
this Note. In short, "taxnapping" is wrong, and this Note shows how to define it
and how the Supreme Court can stop it.
* Member, Maryland State Bar; Attorney, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Office of
Inspector General, Washington, D.C.; J.D., Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A.,
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dorsed by, or affiliated with, the United States Government or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. The content of this Note is solely the viewpoint of the author. The author wishes to thank Professor A.G.
Harmon, J.D., Ph.D. for his expert guidance and insight during the conception, revision, and completion of this
Note, as well as Professor Norman Stein for his assistance in the initial stages of working through the Murphy case
and its direct taxation implications. In addition, the author wishes to thank his fiancde, Suzanne, for her constant
love and endless support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Taxnapping" can be understood to occur when the judiciary steals tax policy
debate away from the legislature.' There are three prerequisites for taxnapping to
occur: (1) a tax case must be before the court; (2) the court's decision must have
the potential to alter tax policy; and (3) the court's opinion must leave the tax law
ambiguous. When these three elements combine, there is taxnapping because the
courthouse doors swing open for tax policy protestors to reroute their policy argu-
ments through the judiciary instead of through the legislature. An unclear judicial
decision that has the potential to change tax policy will create an incentive for
those in opposition to file lawsuits in hopes of exploiting the law to alter tax policy.
Therefore, whenever a court fails to clarify the tax law in an area that has a signifi-
cant chance of altering tax policy, the court has taxnapped, thereby making it poss-
ible for tax policy protestors to change tax policy in the courtroom instead of at the
voting booth.
Taxnapping leads to inappropriate and undemocratic results. With taxnapping
exposing the judiciary to competing tax policy arguments, courts are placed in the
position of favoring one side's argument and thereby rendering a decision that un-
derhandedly creates tax policy. But courts are inappropriate policymaking fora
because they lack the necessary resources.2 Without the legislature's ability to hold
hearings and consult with experts, courts cannot obtain the best possible informa-
tion on which to base sound policy decisions.3 In addition, courts are not adequate-
ly staffed to evaluate the effectiveness of their policy decisions.4 Policymaking in
the judiciary is also undemocratic because it allows judges-always a minority-to
render a decision that makes public policy without the approval of the majority. 5
1. The term "taxnapping" is a term of art used for the first time by this author. Also, please note that
throughout this paper, "taxnapping" is discussed in its federal manifestation because the noted case of Murphy v.
Internal Revenue Service (Murphy 1), 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), which created the idea for the term, only
relates to federal tax law. However, there is no reason why the term "taxnapping" cannot also refer to state court
decisions on state tax law.
2. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 69 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the judiciary
lacks the ability to hold hearings and must "grope ahead with only the assistance of the parties, or perhaps random
amici curiae") (emphasis in original); G. ALAN TARR, JUDICIAL PROCESS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 299 (4th
ed. 2006) (summarizing "well-known" judicial policymaking critic, Donald Horowitz, as asserting that "courts are
less likely than other institutions to obtain relevant information and use it effectively" because, for example, courts
decide cases based on "legal considerations rather than on the desirability of a policy or the likely consequences of
alternative approaches to a problem").
3. See Hon. Malcolm Richard Wilkey, Judicial Activism, Congressional Abdication, and the Need for
Constitutional Reform, 8 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 511 (1985) (describing that courts have "no facilities for
holding public hearings to gather expert information and facts on which important policy decisions should be
based").
4. Id. at 512.
5. See id. at 504 (describing the process of judges making policy as containing a "fundamentally anti-
majoritarian element"). It is also important to note that taxnapping in the main case of Murphy v. Internal Revenue
Service is especially undemocratic. In some contexts, judicial policymaking, although never absolutely favored,
can occasionally be acceptable. See TARR, supra note 2, at 299 (describing how judicial policymaking is not
necessarily always undemocratic, such as when the court engages in "statutory policymaking and judicial over-
sight of administrative agencies" and the judges are "presumably giving effect to, rather than overriding, the will
of the legislature"). However, "constitutional policymaking," which is what occurs in Murphy v. Internal Revenue
Service, is inappropriate because it often pits the elected legislature directly against the unelected judiciary. Id.
Vol. 12
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It is difficult to imagine a greater ambiguity in tax law than the constitutional
mystery of direct taxation. The term "direct tax" derives from two provisions in
the United States Constitution that limit Congress's power to tax.6 Although the
Constitution grants Congress the broad power "[t]o lay and collect [t]axes, ' 7 this
authority is limited by the two direct tax clauses found in Article I, Section 2 8 and
Article I, Section 9.9 Read together, these clauses restrain Congress from imposing
a "direct" tax unless the tax is "apportioned,"' 0 meaning that the tax would have to
be structured so that each state pays the tax in proportion to its population."
The mystery of the direct tax clauses exists because the term "direct tax" was
never defined in the text of the Constitution. 12 In fact, when Rufus King asked the
assembly for a "precise meaning of direct taxation" at the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787, no one answered him. 13 Modem legal scholars continue to argue over
the meaning of the term, citing to sources such as the dictionary of 1787,14 the Fe-
deralist Papers,' 5 and even the economic theories of the French Physiocrats.16 In
addition, scholars such as Yale Professor Bruce Ackerman point out that the direct
tax clauses originated as part of a "political compromise" over slavery. 17 Acker-
man argues that the apportionment requirement of direct taxation was placed into
the Constitution so that slave states, if they wanted their slaves to count toward
representation in the House, would have to pay taxes in proportion to their popula-
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing that "direct [t]axes shall be apportioned among the several
States... according to their respective [n]umbers ... ").
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (providing that "[n]o [c]apitation, or other direct, [tiax shall be laid,
unless in [p]roportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken").
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (limiting Congress's power to tax by providing that "direct [t]axes
shall be apportioned among the several States... according to their respective [n]umbers ...."); U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 4 (limiting Congress's power to levy a "[c]apitation, or other direct, [tax" unless such tax is "in
[p]roportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken").
1I. See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (describing how
direct taxes would require any flat tax rate to "vary... on a state-by-state basis with the aim of assuring that each
one contributed a sum proportional to its population"). Professor Ackerman also comments on the regressive
nature of the apportionment requirement. Ackerman states, "[Apportionment] means that the citizens of a poor
state such as Alabama-whose per capita levels of income and consumption are relatively low-would have to
pay a higher flat tax than citizens of a rich state such as Oregon." Id.
12. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (stating that "direct [t]axes shall be apportioned among the several
States... according to their respective [n]umbers .... without any further definition of the term "direct [t]axes");
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 (providing that "[c]apitation, or other direct, [t]ax" must be "in [p]roportion to the
Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken" without providing any indication as to the meaning of
the phrase "or other direct" tax).
13. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 350 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press 1911)
(1787).
14. See Calvin H. Johnson, Fixing the Constitutional Absurdity of the Apportionment of Direct Tax, 21
CONST. COMMENT. 295, 314 (2004) (stating, under the subsection "The 1787 Dictionary Meaning of 'Direct
Tax,"' that the dictionary definition of"direct tax" would have listed it as "a synonym for apportioned tax").
15. See Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334, 2395 (1997) (defining direct taxation by extrapolating from Alexander Hamilton's
definition of indirect taxes in The Federalist No. 36).
16. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 16-17 (stating that the idea of distinguishing direct taxation from
other taxes, such as indirect taxation, was first introduced by John Locke and then "more systematically developed
in the course of the eighteenth century by the school of French Physiocrats led by Francois Quesnay and Baron
Turgot").
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tion. 18 However, Professor Erik M. Jensen argues that a focus on slavery alone is
inappropriate because the direct tax clauses were also meant to limit the new feder-
al government's power to enact "sectionally directed" taxes on the states. 1
9
It should come as no surprise that arguments over the meaning of the direct tax
clauses quickly came before the United States Supreme Court. Beginning in 1787,
with the case of Hylton v. United States, and continuing on for nearly a century, the
Supreme Court defined direct taxation so narrowly that the term was essentially
read out of the Constitution.2° In case after case, no taxes imposed by Congress
were struck down due to the Court's constricted reading of the direct tax clauses. 21
But in 1895, nearly one hundred years of precedent changed when the Supreme
Court decided Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. and struck down the entire
federal income tax for violating the direct tax clauses.22  Despite this fact, imme-
diately after Pollock, the Court quickly changed its mind and began eroding its
rationale for the Pollock decision and upholding many federal taxes as constitu-
tional.
23
As the Court was beginning to move away from the Pollock rationale, 24 a ma-
jor event occurred: the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.25
Proposed by President Taft as an effort to allow Congress to impose a broad in-
18. Id.
19. Erik M. Jensen, Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 355,377 (2004).
20. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 181 (1796) (stating that the Constitution's use of the
term "direct taxes" refers to only such taxes "as could be apportioned") (emphasis in original); Pacific Ins. Co. v.
Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 446 (1869) (applying the Hylton rule that direct taxes are only those that can be
apportioned and holding that a tax on the income of an insurance company was not a direct tax); Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 546 (1869) (stating, in accordance with the narrow definition of direct tax described
in Hylton, that the only direct taxes requiring apportionment are "capitation taxes," "taxes on land," and "perhaps
taxes on personal property by general valuation and assessment of the various descriptions possessed with the
several States"); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 346-47 (1874) (holding that a real estate tax for succes-
sion during the Civil War was only an excise tax and not a direct tax because it was a tax on the transfer of proper-
ty); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 602 (1880) (citing Hylton and holding that the Civil War income was
not a direct tax because direct taxes are only capitation taxes and taxes on land).
21. See Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 181 (upholding a carriage tax); Pacific Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 446
(upholding a tax on the income of insurance companies); Veazie Bank, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 546 (upholding a ten
percent tax on the insurance of bank notes); Scholey, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) at 346-47 (upholding a real estate tax for
succession during the Civil War); Springer, 102 U.S. at 602 (upholding an income tax imposed to fund the Civil
War).
22. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock 1), 157 U.S. 429, 583 (1895) (holding that the
portions of the post-Civil War income tax that imposed taxes on "rents" or "income of real estate" violated the
direct tax clauses); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I1), 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (holding that
taxes on "personal property" and on "the income of real property" are direct taxes and striking down the entire
income tax of 1894 as unconstitutional because it constitutes "one entire scheme of taxation").
23. See, e.g., Gregory L. Germain, Taxing Emotional Injury Recoveries: A Critical Analysis of Murphy v.
Internal Revenue Service, 60 ARK. L. REv. 185, 230-40 (describing how the Supreme Court began a "retreat"
from the Pollock cases by allowing taxes on the exchange of property to be upheld despite the fact that Pollock's
rationale was based on the idea that it was not exchange that mattered but whether "the source of item subject to
tax was property").
24. See, e.g., id. at 231-35 (discussing how the next two cases after Pollock, Knowlton v. Moore and Tho-
mas v. United States, moved away from Pollock's focus on whether the source of the tax was property and instead
the Court became more concerned with whether the tax was placed on a transaction).
25. See id. at 237-38 (showing the importance of the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 by
stating that it prevented the Supreme Court from creating a "fully developed.., distinction between direct and
indirect taxation").
4
Barry Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol12/iss1/2
Spring 2009
come tax,26 the Sixteenth Amendment created an exception that allowed income
taxes to be imposed even if they were direct taxes and violated the apportionment
27requirement. The passage of the Sixteenth Amendment restrained the Court from
developing a clear definition of direct taxation.28 All direct taxes on "income"
were now protected from the apportionment rules.29
However, the direct tax clauses and their apportionment requirement were not
wiped out entirely by the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment. 30 The clauses still
retain their full effect on taxes that are not "income" taxes. 31 Since 1934, the Su-
preme Court has not heard a case on the meaning of the direct tax clauses.32 The
Court's long silence has left many questions unanswered, including what, if any,
precendential weight should be given to the Court's two major direct tax cases of
Hylton and Pollock.
In 2007, Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service, decided by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Court chose to unearth
the nearly forgotten direct tax clauses.33 Murphy's treatment of direct taxation is a
disaster and a patent case of taxnapping. The court devotes an entire section of its
opinion to arguments over the meaning of the direct tax clauses, citing to the Fede-
ralist Papers, various legal scholars, and the decisions of both Hylton and Pollock.34
In doing so, the court lays out a convoluted description of the law that comes no-
where near a clear rule.35 Moreover, the court contradicts its own view of the case
law by citing some cases for support while suggesting that those cases may not be
good law in a footnote. 36 What Murphy amounts to is an outline of the open loo-
pholes in the definition of direct taxation-loopholes that can be used by tax policy
protestors when they do not get their way in Congress.
Murphy's practical impact is that the decision places fundamental income tax
reform in jeopardy of being held up inappropriately and undemocratically by the
judiciary.37 In the past few decades, many scholars have proposed a wide range of
26. Id. at 237.
27. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (stating, "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to
any census or enumeration").
28. See Germain, supra note 23, at 237-38 (stating that the court "never fully developed the distinction
between direct and indirect taxation because Congress passed and the states adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution in 1913").
29. Id.
30. Id. at 240.
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (providing that only "taxes on incomes" may be imposed without appor-
tionment).
32. ERIK M. JENSEN, DiRECT TAxEs IN THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 159, 160 (David F.
Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2005).
33. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy 1), 493 F.3d 170, 180-86 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., id. at 181-85 (outlining the arguments presented by Murphy on direct taxation and the argu-
ments presented by the government on direct taxation-many of which are based on the Federalist Papers and
originalism-and then rejecting the theories of both sides in order to move to an excise tax analysis).
36. See id. at 181 n.** (citing case law to support that there are three taxes that are "definitely known" to
be direct taxes but also questioning in a footnote whether caselaw relied on in creating this list of three taxes is
good law).




Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
Barry Law Review
policy proposals for fundamental reform of the federal income tax system. 38 Res-
ponding to various inefficiencies in the current federal income tax,39 no less than
five different tax reform systems have been proposed.40 The major reform propos-
als include: (1) a national retail sales tax,41 (2) a value-added tax,42 (3) a flat tax,43
(4) a "USA," or "unlimited savings allowance," tax,44 and (5) a "FairTax. ' '45 Un-
derstanding the pros and cons of each reform proposal can be daunting, and there
are seemingly endless arguments and counterarguments on each side.46 Many of
these tax proposals will shift the tax base from "income," which is exempt from the
direct tax clauses,47 to "consumption, ' 48 which is not so clearly exempt from the
direct tax clauses.49 If any of these reform proposals were to become federal law,
Murphy's failure to create a clear rule on direct taxation allows those who oppose
tax reform to run to the courts and use the ambiguous law of direct taxation to push
aside the will of the majority.
This Note argues that Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service is a problematic case
of taxnapping that threatens to reroute the public debate over fundamental income
tax reform. In Part II, this Note begins by providing a brief snapshot of the com-
plex policy debate over fundamental income tax reform. Part III outlines the scope
of Congress's power to tax and the ways in which this power is limited by the di-
rect tax clauses. Part IV focuses on the direct tax clauses and describes the confu-
sion over the original meaning by summarizing the many different originalist inter-
pretations. Part V shows how the case law of the United States Supreme Court has
only amplified the confusion over the meaning of the direct tax clauses. Part VI
38. See generally MICHAEL J. BOSKIN, FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) (compil-
ing essays on all income tax reform proposals, including the flat tax, retail sales tax, value-added tax, USA tax,
and hybrid consumption tax).
39. See, e.g., J. Scott Moody, Wendy P. Warcholik & Scott A. Hodge, The Rising Cost of Complying with
the Federal Income Tax, 138 TAx FOUNDATION 1, 1 (2005) (predicting that in 2005 "individuals, businesses, and
non-profits will spend an estimated 6 billion hours complying with the federal income tax code," which amounts
to a compliance cost of roughly $265.1 billion).
40. See HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM G. GALE, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL
TAX REFORM 1, 6-14 (Henry J. Aaron & William G. Gale eds., 1996) (outlining briefly the various pros and cons
of each major income tax reform proposal).
41. Id. at6.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 12; Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax: A Simple, Progressive Consumption Tax, in
FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 27-53 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996).
44. AARON & GALE, supra note 40, at 12-13; Murray Weidenbaum, The Nunn-Domenici USA Tax: Analy-
sis and Comparisons, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 54-69 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996).
45. NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE FAIRTAX BOOK: SAYING GOODBYE TO THE INCOME TAX AND THE
IRS (2005); NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, FAIRTAX: THE TRUTH, ANSWERING THE CRITICS (2008).
46. See AARON & GALE, supra note 40, at 6-14 (outlining briefly the pros and cons of each major proposal
in the fundamental tax reform debate).
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (exempting "taxes on incomes" from the apportionment requirement).
48. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 2402-09 (describing the retail sales tax, value-added tax, flat tax, and
USA tax as "consumption taxes"); Lester B. Snyder & Mariane Gallegos, Redefining the Role of the Federal
Income Tax: Taking the Tax Law "Private "' Through the Flat Tax and Other Consumption Taxes, 13 AM. J. TAX.
POL'Y 1,8-18 (1996) (describing the flat tax, USA tax, and value-added tax as all "consumption" taxes).
49. Compare Jensen, supra note 15, at 2407 (arguing that the flat tax and the USA tax are "direct" taxes
and that they will have to be apportioned), with Lawrence Zelenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the
Conscientious Legislator, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 837-45, 855 (1999) (critiquing Jensen's argument that the flat
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analyzes the case of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service and describes how the
court's decision, like the many cases before it, leaves the law on direct taxation
incredibly unclear. In conclusion, Part VII argues that Murphy's treatment of di-
rect taxation is a clear case of taxnapping and describes how the Supreme Court
can solve Murphy's taxnapping deficiency and make sure tax policy decisions stay
out of the judiciary.
II. FEDERAL TAX REFORM: FROM THE DRUNKEN PAST TO THE CONSUMPTION
PRESENT
Tax reform in the United States dates as far back as the Whiskey Rebellion of
1794. The Whiskey Rebellion began on July 16, 1794, when roughly fifty western
Pennsylvania men protested the collection of a tax on all "domestically distilled
spirits."50 When John Neville, the local tax collector, refused to resign his post or
hand over his collection records, the shooting began, leaving one man dead.5' The
next day, the mob grew to between 400 and 800 individuals who began setting
homes and barns on fire throughout the region. 52 After the masses grew to include
7,000 Pennsylvanians and a multitude of others from western Maryland, President
George Washington gathered 12,950 militiamen to finally crush the insurrection.53
Although gunfire and arson are no longer the chosen methods of today's tax
protestors, the United States still retains its distaste for taxation. In the past several
decades, the tax reform movement in the United States has focused narrowly on
one particular method of taxation: the federal income tax.54 Criticisms abound
concerning the current federal income tax system. 55 For example, in 2005, a report
issued by the Tax Foundation estimated the cost of complying with the current
federal income tax at $265.1 billion.5 6 In response to these and other deficiencies,
no less than five major tax reform systems have been proposed.57  As described
previously, the major reform proposals include (1) a national retail sales tax,58 (2) a
value-added tax,5 9 (3) a flat tax,6 ° (4) a "USA," or "unlimited savings allowance,"
tax,61 and (5) a "FairTax."
62





54. See AARON & GALE, supra note 40, at 1 (stating that proposals for fundamental tax reform, such as
proposals to "alter or replace the current personal and corporation income taxes," came "barely a decade after
President Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986").
55. See, e.g., Moody, Warcholik & Hodge, supra note 39, at 138 (predicting that in 2005 "individuals,
businesses, and non-profits will spend an estimated 6 billion hours complying with the federal income tax code,"
which amounts to a compliance cost of roughly $265.1 billion).
56. Id.
57. See AARON & GALE, supra note 40, at 6-14 (summarizing many of the major income tax reform pro-
posals).
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 12; Hall & Rabushka, supra note 43, at 27-53.
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Each income tax reform system has its supporters and its opponents. The ar-
guments in favor of each system are as numerous as the criticisms. Those in favor
of these various systems argue that their reforms will lead to simplicity, efficiency,
and fairness. For example, supporters of the national retail sales tax and the flat tax
submit that their systems are simple because each will eliminate the current gradu-
ated tax rates in favor of a single, fixed tax rate on consumption.63 The reforms
outlined in the flat tax, USA tax, and FairTax are claimed to be more economically
efficient than our current federal income tax because each system creates savings
incentives that can be used for future investment. 64 Finally, proponents of the flat
tax and FairTax argue that these systems are fair because each reform proposal
protects low-income taxpayers from a disproportionately high, flat tax rate on their
consumption of basic needs.65
Opponents, on the other hand, counter that these tax reform proposals raise se-
rious administrability and fairness issues. The retail sales tax is criticized as un-
workable because many services are not easily taxable, such as financial services.66
The USA tax, which does not tax any money that is saved, presents transitional
problems because it creates incentives for individuals to hide assets in the transition
phase until they can later be placed into tax-free savings accounts. 67 Both the retail
sales tax and the value-added tax are discounted because, by taxing retail sales, the
systems place heavy tax burdens on low-income taxpayers. 68 And the flat tax sys-
tem and the FairTax system, which both protect low-income taxpayers with exemp-
tions, can nevertheless be criticized as unfair because each plan reduces the tax
62. BOORTZ & LINDER, THE FAIRTAX BOOK, supra note 45; BOORTZ & LINDER, THE TRUTH, supra note
45.
63. See Stephen Moore, The Economic and Civil Liberties Case for a National Sales Tax, in FRONTIERS OF
TAX REFORM 115, 117 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996) (describing how the national sales tax is simple because it
"exempts all savings and investments," eliminates "the double taxation problem," and is "a single flat rate"); Hall
& Rabushka, supra note 43, at 53 (stating that the flat tax "would bring a drastic simplification of the tax system"
because, in part, "[i]t imposes an across-the-board consumption tax at the low rate of 19 percent").
64. See Hall & Rabushka, supra note 43, at 36-37 (describing how under the flat tax system "[s]aving is
untaxed" and, since "[e]very act of investment in the economy ultimately traces back to an act of saving," the flat
tax will provide investment incentives); Weidenbaum, supra note 44, at 59 (outlining how, "under a consumption-
based tax," such as the USA Tax, "both saving and long-term investment are encouraged at the expense of current
consumption"); BOORTZ & LINDER, THE FAIRTAx BOOK, supra note 45, at 108 (claiming, "Virtually every eco-
nomic study on the FairTax proposal concludes that people from one end of the economic spectrum to the other-
from the poor to the very rich-will either start a savings and investment plan or increase the one they already
have").
65. See Hall & Rabushka, supra note 43, at 53 (claiming, "The flat tax is progressive-it exempts the poor
from paying any tax and imposes a tax that is a rising share of income for other taxpayers"); BOORTZ & LINDER,
THE FAIRTAX BOOK, supra note 45, at 108 (describing how the FairTax plan protects low-income taxpayers by
providing a "prebate," which is a "monthly check covering taxes on all basic household necessities").
66. See AARON & GALE, supra note 40, at 7 (criticizing the national retail sales tax because of its "serious
and possibly insuperable administrative problems," such as the difficulty in taxing "banking services").
67. See id. at 13 (stating that the USA Tax raises "administrative problems" because "taxpayers would
have powerful incentives to conceal old wealth, perhaps by moving it offshore, and to bring it back after the new
tax comes into effect, thereby qualifying for the unlimited savings allowance").
68. See id. at 12 (stating, "[T]he value-added tax, like the retail sales tax, imposes disproportionate burdens
on low-income households").
8
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rates of high-income taxpayers and shifts the tax burden onto all remaining taxpay-
ers. 69
The debate over how to best reform the federal income tax raises fundamental
questions about the value system behind the principal source of federal government
revenue. Proponents of reform argue that revenue should be raised efficiently. 70
Opponents argue that revenue should be raised fairly.71 There is no easy answer to
the debate, and any attempt to formulate an answer is no doubt beyond the scope of
this Note. Rather, the purpose of this Note is to clearly outline the appropriate role
for the judiciary in the tax policy process.
III. CONGRESS'S POWER TO TAx AND ITS "DIRECT" LIMITATIONS
While considering the debate on fundamental tax reform, it is easy to believe
that a reform-minded Congress can choose which tax system it prefers, turn the
system into legislation, present it to the President, and wait for the simplicity, effi-
ciency, and fairness to materialize. However, before Congress can make such a
decision, it must overcome the restrictions of the two "direct tax clauses" of the
U.S. Constitution.72
The two direct tax clauses appear in Article I of the Constitution, and their
function is to limit Congress's otherwise plenary power of taxation.73 Article I,
Section 8, Clause 1 grants Congress the broad authority "[t]o lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common De-
fence and general Welfare of the United States., 74 However, Congress's power to
tax is limited in the two direct tax clauses that appear at Article I, Section 2 75 and
Article I, Section 9.76 Article I, Section 2 states the requirement that "direct Taxes
shall be apportioned among the several States . . . according to their respective
Numbers ... Article I, Section 9 provides that "No Capitation, or other direct,
Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before
directed to be taken."
78
69. See e.g., BOORTZ & LtNDER, THE TRUTH, supra note 45, at 176-79 (discussing the criticism that with
the reduction of higher tax rates for higher-income taxpayers, it will be "the middle class" that "foot[s] the bill").
70. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
73. It is important to note that Congress's power to tax is also limited by the "uniformity" rule found at the
end of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Jensen, supra note 15, at 2339-40. This Clause
provides that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1. As Professor Erik Jensen describes, "The uniformity rule has been held to require only geographical
uniformity: the standards that apply in one state must apply in all other states as well." Jensen, supra note 15, at
2340. Jensen provides the following example of the limitation imposed by the uniformity clause: "Congress may
not tax a particular transaction in New York at a ten percent rate and an otherwise identical transaction in Dela-
ware at a fifteen percent rate." Id. The limitations imposed on Congress' taxing authority by the uniformity rule is
not discussed further because the issue is not raised in the case of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service; thus, the
uniformity rule is beyond the scope of the Note.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
75. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
76. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 4.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
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After reviewing the precise language of both direct tax clauses, the limitation
they impose is clear: if Congress wants to impose a direct tax, it must be appor-
tioned. Professor Bruce Ackerman has described what apportionment would look
like if a reform system such as the flat tax system was implemented in the United
States. According to Ackerman, "The Constitution would then require Congress to
vary the flat tax rate on a state-by-state basis with the aim of assuring that each one
contributed a sum proportional to its population." 79 An unfortunate consequence of
the apportionment rule is that in certain instances, such as Ackerman's flat tax ex-
ample, the rule requires citizens of states with lower levels of per capita income to
pay higher tax rates than citizens from states with much higher levels of income. 80
IV. THE MYSTERIOUS ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE "DIRECT TAx" CLAUSES
The mystery of the direct tax clauses exists because the term "direct tax" was
never defined. As Professor Jensen writes, "The debates of the founding genera-
tion are hardly crystal clear, and the substantial body of case law is often hope-
less.' '8  However, the lack of a clear definition has not stopped legal scholars from
pouring through various notebooks8 2 and dictionaries 83 of the founding era in order
to arrive at their own "original" understanding of the direct tax clauses. 84 To date,
there are five different originalist interpretations of the direct tax clauses, each de-
riving from a unique source or a unique method.85 Reading these various interpre-
tations, which nearly all contradict one another, is the first step toward understand-
ing how the confused decision of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service occurred.
Modem scholars use one of two approaches for describing the original under-
standing of the direct tax clauses, with some using both methods. The first method
is to define the direct tax clauses by precisely defining the words "direct tax." The
second method is to define the direct tax clauses by considering how the language
of the clauses made it into the United States Constitution in the first place.
79. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 2.
80. See id. (stating that apportionment "means that citizens of a poor state such as Alabama-whose per
capita levels of income and consumption are relatively low-would have to pay a higher flat tax than citizens of a
rich state such as Oregon"). Professor Calvin Johnson has also written about the unfortunate consequences of the
apportionment rule. According to Johnson, "Apportionment by population preys upon poor states, requiring tax
rates to be highest where the tax base is thinnest. Apportionment by state can force an entire state's quota to fall
upon a few taxpayers, perhaps upon a single innocent taxpayer." Johnson, supra note 14, at 296.
81. Jensen, supra note 15, at 2336.
82. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 11, at 17-18 (citing to Alexander Hamilton's written notes from his
role as attorney in the case ofHylton v. United States in order to argue that the French Physiocrat economists were
"the source of the Founders' belief in the existence of a distinct category of 'direct' taxation").
83. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 14, at 314-19 (looking to the dictionary of 1787 to find the "original"
meaning of"direct tax").
84. See, Ackerman, supra note 11, at 6-20 (discussing the French Physiocrats' definition of direct taxation
under the heading "Original Understandings"); Johnson, supra note 14, at 299-316 (providing the 1787 dictionary
definition of"direct tax" under the heading "The Original Meaning of the Apportionment Requirement").
85. See infra Part IVA-B.
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A. Originalist Approach One: Defining the Clauses by Defining "Direct
Tax"
1. "Land and Head" Definition: Looking to John Locke and the French
Physiocrats
Looking to the origin of the term "direct tax," Yale Professor Bruce Ackerman
argues that the idea of "distinguish[ing] rigorously between 'direct' taxation and
other forms" came from John Locke and the French Physiocrats.86 According to
Ackerman, it was John Locke who "first introduced" this idea, "which was later
'systematically developed' by the French Physiocrats.87 The French Physiocrats
were an eighteenth century school of economic thought that believed the only route
to wealth was through agriculture. 88 Thus, the Physiocrats stated that a tax on land,
which would strike precisely at agriculture, was a direct tax.89 Later, one of the
leaders of the French Physiocrats, Baron Turgot, included a head, or capitation, tax
under the term "direct tax."'9
Although Ackerman states that it was not the "original point" of the direct tax
clauses "to codify the best economic thought on the subject," 91 he nevertheless
points out that the Founding Fathers had the Physiocrats on their mind. First, Al-
exander Hamilton credited the Physiocrats as "the source of the Founders' belief in
... 'direct' taxation. 92 Second, Ackerman argues that John Marshall "reflect[ed]
Physiocratic ideas" when he stated to the Virginia Convention "that direct taxes
were 'well understood' to include taxes on 'land, slaves, stock,' and 'a few other
articles of domestic property."'
93
2. "Avoidance" Definition: Reading Thomas Cooley and Extrapolating from
the Federalist Papers
Professor Erik M. Jensen defines "direct tax" by looking to the nineteenth cen-
tury tax scholar, Thomas Cooley, and also by extrapolating from passages of The
Federalist Papers written by Alexander Hamilton. Jensen states that "the heart of
the historical understanding" of direct taxation can be understood by an avoidance
definition: "direct taxes are imposed differently than indirect taxes, and they cannot
86. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 16-17. It is very important to note that Professor Ackerman does not
believe that he French Physiocrats' understanding of direct tax was the "original point" of the direct tax clauses.
Id. at 19. Instead, Ackerman states, "The original understanding of these clauses was political, not economic." Id.
Ackerman's "political" definition of the direct tax clauses concerns the slavery compromise definition of the
clauses and is discussed in section IV.B.1 of this Note.
87. Id. at 16-17.
88. Id. Professor Ackerman adds that the Physiocrats were "the only reputable economists of the time who
were attempting to construct the distinction between direct and indirect taxation into a central pillar of enlightened
political economy." Id. at 17.
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 19.
92. Id. at 17-18.
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be avoided as easily." 94 Jensen summarizes how this avoidance works as follows:
"[A]n indirect tax is one which the ultimate consumer can generally decide whether
to pay by deciding whether to acquire the taxed product." 95 Jensen argues that
Thomas Cooley's writings from 1876 support his avoidance theory because Cooley
understood direct taxes to be taxes on one's "property, person, business, income,
etc," and indirect taxes to be those "levied on ... commodities before they reach
the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall.",96 In addi-
tion, Jensen finds support by extrapolating from Alexander Hamilton's writings in
The Federalist No. 21. Hamilton wrote that "all duties upon articles of consump-
tion" can be "compared to a fluid, which will in time find its level with the means
of paying for them.",97 Jensen argues that this passage shows Hamilton understood
taxes on consumer goods to include an avoidability feature because such taxes will
force consumers to "adjust their behavior to the cost of such products."
98
3. "Apportioned Taxes" Definition: Reading the Dictionary of 1787
Professor Calvin Johnson defines "direct tax" as it was in the dictionary of
1787. According to Johnson, a 1787 dictionary would define "direct tax" as a syn-
onym for "apportioned tax." 99 He further states that this definition is an outgrowth
of the process of apportionment itself;' 00 whenever the term "direct tax" was used,
it was used to refer to "those taxes [that] were typically apportioned."10 1 Thus,
under the late-eighteenth-century dictionary definition of "direct taxation," Article
1, Section 2 of the Constitution should circularly read, "Representative and appor-
tionable taxes shall be apportioned among the several States.,
10 2
B. Originalist Approach Two: Defining the Clauses by Why They Appear
in the United States Constitution
1. The Clauses Represent a Slavery Compromise
Although Professors Ackerman and Johnson define the direct tax clauses by re-
spectively looking to the French Physiocrats and the dictionary of 1787, they both
argue that the primary origin of the clauses was a slavery compromise.'03 As Ack-
94. Jensen, supra note 15, at 2393 (emphasis added).
95. Id. at 2395.
96. Id. at 2393.
97. Id. at 2395 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 21 (Alexander Hamilton)).
98. Id.
99. Johnson, supra note 14, at 314.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 2354 (discussing, within the context ofHylton v. United States, the circu-
lar nature of the idea that "only those [taxes] that can be practically apportioned" are direct taxes).
103. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 19 (referring to the slavery compromise origin of the clauses and
stating that "the original understanding of [the direct tax] clauses was political" because the language was "aimed
at avoiding the disastrous dissolution of the Founding dream of a 'more perfect Union"'); Johnson, supra note 14,
at 297 (stating, "Apportionment was brought into the Constitution, in the midst of a debate about determining
representation in Congress, so as to discourage the South from acquiring more slaves").
Vol. 12
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erman and Johnson describe, the direct tax clauses were created out of the debate
over how to count slaves for the purpose of representation in Congress. 104 It was
Pennsylvania delegate, Gouverneur Morris, who first proposed the language that
would later become the direct tax clause of Article I, Section 2.105 Because the
South was determined to have its slaves count towards representation, Morris, who
opposed the representation of slaves, moved to have all taxation imposed in pro-
portion to representation. 10 6 The idea, of course, was that if the South wanted to
have additional representation for their slaves, then they would be concomitant-
ly.'0 7 Although Southerners realized the inherent fairness of this compromise, 108
some, such as George Mason and James Wilson, thought that taxation based on
relative populations would raise administrability problems. 109 In response, Morris
suggested that only "direct taxation" should be proportional to population. "0 Mor-
ris's correction has been described as a "miracle cure" because it benefited the
North by not giving away the issue of representation for slaves without conse-
quence, and it benefited the South by limiting the breadth of taxes that must be
apportioned. 1 "
2. The Clauses Prevent "Sectionally Directed Taxation"
Professor Erik Jensen counters the interpretation that slavery was the single
motivating factor behind the direct tax clauses. Jensen writes, "Part-but only
part--of the concern was slavery."' 12 According to Jensen, an additional "reason[]
for [the] existence" of the direct tax clauses, and the corresponding apportionment
104. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 7-8 (describing how the direct tax clauses were "introduced into the
constitutional text" based on the debate between the large and small states for how slaves should be counted for
representation); Johnson, supra note 14, at 306 (stating, "The tax on slaves served to bridge the stalemate... over
how to count slaves for purposes of representation").
105. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 9 (stating that it was Gouverneur Morris who "took the first construc-
tive step" toward connecting taxation to representation).
106. Id. at 8-9 (describing that Morris, in the beginning of July 1787, stated, "[T]he people of Penn. will
never agree to a representation of Negroes," and then discussing that on Thursday, July 12, Morris "moved that
'taxation shall be in proportion to Representation').
107. See id. at 9 (discussing Morris's logic as being, "If the South insisted upon extra representation for its
slaves, why not require it to pay a price at tax time?").
108. See id. (discussing Morris's motion to make taxation proportional to representation and stating, "Even
Southerners who were insisting on full representation for their blacks conceded the justice of this principle, which
resonated deeply in revolutionary ideology").
109. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 307 (stating that George Mason of Virginia was opposed to apportion-
ment because it "would drive Congress to requisitions" and that James Wilson was against apportionment because
"he could not understand how apportionment could be performed unless restricted to direct taxation").
110. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 10.
111. Id. Professor Ackerman also recounts the history of the second direct tax clause that appears in Article
I, Section 9. According to Ackerman, the language of "[njo Capitation, or other direct, [t]ax.. " was entered "at
the last minute" in a "mop-up session" on September 14. Id. at 13. The language was added by George Read of
Delaware. Id. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, some states, such as Delaware, had outstanding debts
to the central government arising out of the old requisition system. Id. Ackerman argues that George Read of
Delaware added in the language of "direct" tax in order to limit the ways in which the new Congress could come
back after Delaware to pay its past requisition debts. Id. Ackerman's point in discussing this history is to show
that that the direct tax clause at Article I, Section 9 was about protection of Delaware and not, as Ackerman puts it,
"some grand principle of taxation." Id.
112. Jensen, supra note 19, at 372.
13
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rule, was to prevent "sectionally directed taxation. ' 13  The apportionment rule
prevents direct taxes from disproportionately falling on one area of the country. "
4
For example, without the apportionment rule, a direct tax "on the ownership of
sleighs" would fall predominantly on the North. 5 However, by adding the appor-
tionment rule, the North cannot become a victim to this "sectionally concentrated
tax" because the remaining states would also bear a proportion of the tax burden. 16
To support his claim that such sectional taxation was a part of the original under-
standing, Jensen writes, "Given the founders' fears of national taxing power, it's
hard to imagine that the Constitution would have included no limitations on direct
taxation even if slavery had not existed."
'" 17
V. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTRICATE JURISPRUDENCE ON DIRECT TAXATION
While constitutional scholars continue searching for the original meaning of
the direct tax clauses, beginning in 1796, the Supreme Court has attempted to form
its own definition of the direct tax clauses. 118 In the first 100 years of case law, the
Court gave a very narrow interpretation to the direct tax clauses. 1 9 However, the
rationale for this narrow interpretation was never clarified. 20  Some Justices ex-
pressed a view of direct taxation that was similar to Professor Johnson's 1787 dic-
tionary approach, that direct taxes are only those that can be easily apportioned. 12'
Other Justices sought to limit the application of the apportionment rule because of
its connection to slavery.
22
After decades of narrow interpretations for various reasons, the Court made an
about-face and gave the clauses an extremely expansive reading in the 1895 case of
Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. 123 However, beginning with the first case
113. Id. at 377.
114. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 2341 (stating, "The apportionment rule... ties a state's share of the total
direct-tax liability to its share of the nation's population, measured using the currently applicable census rules").
115. See Jensen, supra note 19, at 372-73 (providing an example of "sectionally directed taxation" by using
a tax imposed "on the ownership of sleighs" and writing, "Although rates may be the same throughout the country
... only the North will bear the burden of the tax-unless the tax is direct").
116. See id. (describing how, due to apportionment, a direct tax on sleighs "must also fall on states with a
sleigh deficit-with the liability of any state dependent on its fraction of the national population, not the concen-
tration of sleighs in that state").
117. Id. at 377.
118. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 2351 (stating that Hylton v. United States, decided in 1796, was when "the
Supreme Court first considered the meaning of 'direct taxes').
119. See Germain, supra note 23, at 217-25 (surveying the first 100 years of case law interpreting the direct
tax clauses and concluding that "[t]he early courts had thus interpreted the direct taxing clause[s] very narrowly").
120. See id. at 217-21 (discussing the various opinions in Hylton v. United States and stating that it is "diffi-
cult to glean a clear rule" from the case).
121. See, e.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (Chase, J.) (stating, "The Constitu-
tion evidently contemplated no taxes as direct taxes, but only such as Congress could lay in proportion to the
census").
122. See, e.g., Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 177-78 (Paterson, J.) (discussing the direct tax clauses' connection
to slavery and concluding, "The rule of apportionment ... is radically wrong; it cannot be supported by any solid
reasoning.... The rule, therefore, ought not to be extended by construction.").
123. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock I1), 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (expanding the
Court's interpretation of the direct tax clauses to include taxes on all income from real and personal property);
Ackerman, supra note 11, at 28 (discussing the case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. under the heading
14
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after Pollock, the Court never again expressed such a broad reading of the claus-
es. 124  Eventually, the Court called the Pollock decision "mistaken,"'' 25 but the
Court never formally overruled the opinion. 126 As the case law got more confusing
and the states ratified the Sixteenth Amendment (which made way for the current
federal income tax), the Court became increasingly silent. 127 Eventually, the Court
stopped discussing direct taxation in 1934.128 The following section of this Note
outlines a broad overview of the Supreme Court's direct tax jurisprudence.
A. The Hylton Century: The Supreme Court Narrowly Interprets the
Direct Tax Clauses
The first major case to address the meaning of the direct tax clauses was Hyl-
ton v. United States, decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1796. On June
5, 1794, Congress imposed a tax on passenger carriages. 129 The carriage tax was
part of Alexander Hamilton's plan to increase federal revenue by levying "luxury"
taxes. 130 When Daniel Hylton was fined for failing to pay the carriage tax on his
125 carriages, he filed suit claiming that the carriage tax was unconstitutional be-
cause it was an un-apportioned "direct tax.",13' The procedural history of the case
is unclear; 32 however, the Supreme Court heard the case during the February Term
of 1796.133
The Hylton decision does not have an "Opinion of the Court" because the older
Supreme Court cases were written seriatim, with each member of the Court ex-
pressing his opinion in turn. '34 Ultimately, the Court determined that the carriage
tax was not a direct tax, and thus apportionment was not required; however, each
Justice provided his own rationale for the decision. Therefore, Hylton stands as a
case with a very clear outcome, but with an extremely unclear rationale.
"The Court Reverses Itself' and stating that Pollock was "one of the Court's greatest breaches with the principle of
stare decisis").
124. See Germain, supra note 23, at 230-39 (discussing various post-Pollock cases to show how the Court
immediately effected a "retreat").
125. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916).
126. See Germain, supra note 23, at 242 (stating that "Pollock... was not overruled in Stanton" due to the
fact that the Sixteenth Amendment undercut Pollock's primary rationale).
127. See id. at 237-38 (explaining, "The courts never filly developed the distinction between the direct and
indirect taxation because Congress passed and the states adopted the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in 1913").
128. Jensen, supra note 32, at 160.
129. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 171 (1796).
130. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 20. Hamilton's "luxury" taxes were strongly opposed by Jefferson and
Madison. Id. Professor Ackerman writes that Jefferson and Madison believed that Hamilton's sin tax was just
another example of "the Federalists' nationalizing pretensions." Id. According to Professor Erik Jensen, Hylton
was a "test case crafted out of whole cloth" so that a Court dominated by Federalists can increase the power of the
national government. Jensen, supra note 15, at 2351.
131. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 171-72.
132. Germain, supra note 23, at 218.
133. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 171.
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Only three of five Justices wrote substantive opinions in the case: Justices Sa-
muel Chase, William Paterson, and James Iredell. 135 Taken collectively, the Justic-
es put forth three different interpretations of the direct tax clauses. Justices Chase
and Iredell expressed the first interpretation.136 Both Justices believed that direct
taxes were only those taxes easily capable of apportionment. 137 Writing first, Jus-
tice Chase stated, "The Constitution evidently contemplated no taxes as direct tax-
es, but only such as Congress could lay in proportion to the census.' ' 138  Justice
Iredell, writing later in the decision, wholeheartedly agreed with Justice Chase,
writing that is was "evident that the Constitution contemplated [no taxes] as direct
but such as could be apportioned."' 139 Essentially, this narrow interpretation of
clauses reads the text out of the Constitution. As Professor Jensen has stated, "[i]f
apportionment is to be applied only when it makes no difference, what's the point
of the Direct-Tax Clauses?"
' 140
The second interpretation of the clauses, expressed in the Hylton decision, was
that there are only two forms of direct taxation: capitation taxes and taxes on
land. 14' The primary proponent of this view was Justice Chase. 142 After previously
stating that direct taxes are only those capable of apportionment, Justice Chase
ended his legal reasoning with some of his personal opinion, stating, "I am inclined
to think, but of this I do not give a judicial opinion, that the direct taxes contem-
plated by the Constitution are only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, . . . and a
tax on [land].' 43 The bulk of this view was seconded by Justice Paterson's belief
that the "principal" forms of taxation that the framers intended be apportioned were
"a capitation tax and a tax on land."' 144 However, Justice Paterson specifically
qualified his agreement with Justice Chase by writing that capitation taxes and land
taxes, in his opinion, were not "the only" forms of direct taxation. 1
45
Justice Paterson alone expressed the third and final reading of the direct tax
clauses. Justice Paterson stated that the apportionment rule, as contained in the
direct tax clauses, should be curtailed because of the rule's relationship with sla-
very. '46 He wrote that the clauses were merely "a work of compromise" intended
to protect the Southern states from having their land and slaves taxed arbitrarily by
the other states in the Union. 147 In Justice Paterson's words, if it were not for the
135. See Germain, supra note 23, at 218 (stating that only three Justices "issued substantive separate opi-
nions").
136. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 2352-2354 (stating that Justice Chase's and Justice Iredell's opinions are
examples of "Proposition I" that can be gleaned from Hylton, which is that "direct taxes are only those that can be
practicably apportioned").
137. Id.; Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 174, 181.
138. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 174.
139. Id. at 181.
140. Jensen, supra note 19, at 379.
141. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 175.
142. See Germain, supra note 23, at 219 (discussing Justice Chase's view that there are only two kinds of
direct taxes: a capitation tax and a tax on land).
143. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) at 175.
144. Id. at 177 (Paterson, J.).
145. Id.
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apportionment rule, "[t]he Southern States ... would have been wholly at the mer-
cy of the other States. 1 48 In concluding his discussion on the tainted history of the
apportionment rule, Justice Paterson stated, "The rule, therefore, ought not to be
extended by construction.
149
Despite its three-part interpretation of the direct tax clauses, Hylton clearly
shows that a majority of the Court believed that the direct tax clauses should be
read narrowly. Over the course of the next 100 years, the Court would continue to
follow the Hylton decision and restrict its interpretation of the clauses, thereby al-
lowing the federal government a large amount of freedom in how it chose to raise
revenue. 150 The two Hylton interpretations that remained over the next century
were: (1) direct taxes are only those that can be easily apportioned, and (2) direct
taxes only come in two forms, capitation taxes and taxes on land.' 51 Of the many
cases that followed these two interpretations, the best examples are Pacific Insur-
ance Co. v. Soule and Springer v. United States.
In 1868, Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule affirmed the Hylton rationale that di-
rect taxes are only those taxes that can be practically apportioned.152 The plaintiff
in Pacific Insurance Co. challenged the constitutionality of the first federal income
tax.153 In part, Pacific Insurance's lawsuit claimed that it was entitled to recover
taxes on its business income because such taxes were unconstitutional direct tax-
es. 154 In its holding, the Court refused to find that the tax on Pacific Insurance's
business income was direct because it could not be fairly apportioned. 55 Writing
for the Court, Justice Swayne explained how apportionment would not be appro-
priate in this case:
The [results of apportionment] are very obvious. Where such cor-
porations are numerous and rich, it might be light; where none ex-
ist, it could not be collected; where they are few and poor, it would
148. Id. at 177.
149. Id. at 178.
150. See Pac. Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 446 (1868) (applying the Hylton rule that direct taxes
are only those that can be apportioned and holding that a tax on the income of an insurance company was not a
direct tax); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 546 (1869) (stating, in accordance with the narrow
definition of direct tax described in Hylton, that the only direct taxes requiring apportionment are "capitation
taxes," "taxes on land," and "perhaps taxes on personal property by general valuation and assessment of the vari-
ous descriptions possessed with the several States"); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 346-47 (1875)
(holding that a real estate tax for succession during the Civil War was only an excise tax and not a direct tax be-
cause it was a tax on the transfer of property); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 601-02 (1880) (citing
Hylton and holding that the Civil War income was not a direct tax because direct taxes are only capitation taxes
and taxes on land).
151. See Germain, supra note 23, at 221-25 (discussing the next 100 years of cases after Hylton v. United
States and showing that Hylton's rule that direct taxes are only those capable of apportionment continued to be
used, as well as the rule that direct taxes only come in two forms: capitation and land taxes). Professor Germain
also describes that the first 100 years of cases after Hylton showed that maybe "general lists of personal property
would be subject to apportionment." However, because this conclusion is not one of Hylton's three main opinions,
the author has omitted this suggestion from the textual discussion.
152. Pac. Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 446.
153. Id. at 436, 440-42; Germain, supra note 23, at 221-22.
154. Pac. Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 440-41,443.
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fall upon them with such weight as to involve annihilation. It can-
not be supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended that
any tax should be apportioned, the collection of which on that
principle would be attended with such results. 1
56
However, Hylton's "capability of apportionment" rationale was not the only
view followed during the Hylton century. In 1880, Springer v. United States fol-
lowed Hylton's interpretation that there are only two types of direct taxes, capita-
tion taxes and taxes on land.157 In Springer, the plaintiff, William M. Springer,
refused to pay a tax assessment of $4,799.80 on $50,798.00 of income because the
tax was direct and must be apportioned. 158 The Court rejected Springer's claim in a
single sentence of analysis. 5 9 After stating that "direct taxes, within the meaning
of the Constitution, are only capitation taxes ... and taxes on real estate,"'160 the
Court found that the tax on Springer's income was not direct precisely because it
did not fit into either of the two categories of capitation or land. 161 Ultimately, the
Court ruled that the tax was an "excise or duty."'
162
B. The Pollock Case Stops the Hylton Century in its Tracks
The Hylton centl':y of narrow interpretation came to an abrupt end in 1895
when the Supreme Court issued two opinions in the case of Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. 163 Professor Ackerman, a critic of the Pollock cases, has stated
that Pollock "blew [the direct tax] clauses up to unprecedented proportions.' 164
The Pollock cases arose as a challenge to Congress's enactment of an income tax in
1894. 165 The model for the 1894 income tax was the statute from Springer v. Unit-
ed States, which the Court upheld in that decision. '6 Charles Pollock was a share-
holder in Farmers' Loan & Trust Company. 167 In order to prevent the company
from complying with the federal income tax of 1894, Pollock sued Farmer's Loan
& Trust Co., claiming, among other things, that all taxes on income from the busi-
ness's "real and personal property" were direct taxes and must be apportioned. 168
Although Pollock was two separate cases, the Court's decision can be col-
lapsed into one holding. After digging deeply into the historical understanding of
156. Pac. Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 446.
157. Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880).
158. Id. at 587-89.




163. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (Pollock 1), 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. (Pollock 1I), 158 U.S. 601 (1895). The Court issued two rulings on the Pollock case, Pollockl on April
8, 1895, Pollock 1, 157 U.S. at 429, and Pollock II on May 20, 1895. Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 601.
164. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 28.
165. Id.; Germain, supra note 23, at 225.
166. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 28.
167. PollockI, 157 U.S. at 430.
168. Id. at 430-33; Germain, supra note 23, at 225.
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direct and indirect taxation,' 69 the Court broadly held that a tax on all income from
both real and personal property was a direct tax that required apportionment. 1
70
The Court's expansive decision was largely based on what Professor Ackerman has
called a "tracing principle."' 17' In order to hold that income from real and personal
property was a direct tax, the Court had to show why a tax on income from proper-
ty was the same as a tax on the property itself. 72 Chief Justice Fuller, writing for
the Court, believed there was no difference, and stated as follows:
The real question is, is there any basis upon which to rest the con-
tention that real estate belongs to one of the two great classes of
taxes, and the rent or income which is the incident of its ownership
belongs to the other? We are unable to perceive any ground for the
alleged distinction. 173
Thus, as Professor Jensen has stated, under Pollock, "a tax on the income from
property was deemed to be equivalent to a tax on the property itself.' 74 In the end,
Pollock resulted in the Court striking down the entire 1894 federal income tax as
unconstitutional. 1
75
C. Was Pollock a Mistake? The Supreme Court Quickly Sounds Retreat
The Pollock decision unleashed major political backlash primarily because the
case greatly limited the taxing power of the federal government. 176 As a result, the
Court immediately stepped back from a broad reading of the direct tax clauses. 177
The case of Knowlton v. Moore exemplifies how the Court performed its retreat.
178
In Knowlton, the issue was whether an un-apportioned inheritance tax was constitu-
169. Pollockl, 157 U.S. at 555-84.
170. Pollock I, 158 U.S. at 637.
171. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 29.
172. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 29 (stating that in order "[tlo leap over" various "conceptual ob-
stacle[s]" and find that income from real and personal property was a direct tax, the Court had to create a "tracing
principle").
173. PollockI, 157 U.S. at 581.
174. Jensen, supra note 15, at 2343.
175. See Pollock II, 158 U.S. at 637 (holding that
the tax imposed by sections 27 to 37, inclusive, of the act of 1894, so far as it falls on the income of real estate, and
of personal property, being a direct tax, within the meaning of the constitution, and therefore unconstitutional and
void, because not apportioned according to representation, all those sections, constituting one entire scheme of
taxation, are necessarily invalid).
176. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 11, at 31 n.l 19 (citing ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., HISTORY OF
AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 1828-29 (1971)) (describing how the Democratic Party Platform of 1896
struck out against Pollock and called for Congress "to use all the Constitutional power which remains after the
decision, or which may come from its reversal by the court as it may hereafter be constituted, so that the burdens
of taxation may be equally and impartially laid, to the end that wealth may bear its due proportion of the expense
of the Government").
177. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 31 (stating, "[A]t this stage, it is enough to say that political opposi-
tion to Pollock was so intense that the Court soon began to retreat from its aggressive course"); Germain, supra
note 23, at 230 (writing, "[T]he negative political reaction to the... decision... led the Court quickly to retreat").
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tional. 179  Considering Pollock's tracing rule, it would seem that this tax, which
applied to a decedent's property, would be a direct tax. 18  However, the Court
upheld the tax as a "duty or excise."181
The Court's about-face in Knowlton was based on two different rationales.
First, the Court moved entirely away from the tracing rule in Pollock to a new un-
derstanding of direct taxation based on "exchange.' 82  The Court stated, "Direct
taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon the possession and enjoyments of
rights; indirect taxes are levied upon the happening of an event or an exchange.
183
Professor Germain points out that the Court's shift to a focus on an "event or ex-
change" is "very different" from the Pollock rationale because the Pollock decision
focused "on whether the source of the item subject to tax was property." 184
Second, the Court refused to adopt the economic argument that the inheritance tax
was direct because it could not be "shifted., 185 The Court rejected this interpreta-
tion by pointing out that the Pollock decision was not based on shift-ability but on
the Court's belief that there is no difference between taxes on income from proper-
ty and a tax on the actual property.
186
D. From Retreat to Surrender? The Citizens and the Court (Almost)
Reject Pollock
As the Court was continuing to move away from a broad reading of the direct
tax clauses, two major events dramatically altered the legal landscape of direct
taxation: the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court's
decision in Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co.t87 Although neither event can be appro-
priately called the coup de grace of Pollock,188 each of these events significantly
called into question the precedential weight of the case.
Initiated out of anger over the Pollock decision, 89 the Sixteenth Amendment
made the issue of direct taxation moot, so long as Congress taxed "incomes."''9
Upset over the Pollock decision, Congress was determined to challenge the Su-
179. Germain, supra note 23, at 230.
180. See Ackerman, supra note 11, at 31-32 (discussing Knowlton and stating, "[A]t first glance, this levy
seemed much more 'direct' than the income tax condemned by Pollock. After all, it directly hit the property itself
181. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 83.
182. See Germain, supra note 23, at 231 (describing how Knowlton's theory of "exchange" was "very dif-
ferent from the theory underlying Pollock").
183. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 47.
184. Germain, supra note 23, at 231.
185. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 81-82.
186. Id.
187. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916).
188. See Germain, supra note 23, at 242 (stating, "Pollock H was not overruled in Stanton, but only because
Pollock II's 'mistaken' source theory had been rendered moot by the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment").
189. See, e.g., Germain, supra note 23, at 237 (stating that President Taft's proposal to enact the Sixteenth
Amendment was a compromise proposal that counterbalanced the "strong support in Congress for enacting a new
broad-based income tax with which to challenge Pollock II head-on").
190. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (providing that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes... without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration").
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preme Court's ruling with a major piece of income tax legislation. 191 However,
President Taft offered a solution: Why not avoid the necessity of another Court
ruling and just amend the Constitution? 192 The outgrowth of President Taft's com-
promise was the Sixteenth Amendment. 193 The language of the Amendment per-
mits Congress to tax "incomes" without apportionment. 194  Thus, after the
Amendment's enactment in 1913, Congress could freely tax incomes without ever
having to worry if such taxes were direct or indirect. Professor Johnson comments
that the Sixteenth Amendment was a reversal of Pollock by "the nation as a
whole,"' 95 and, according to Professor Ackerman, the Amendment was Pollock's
final repudiation. 1
96
However, the Sixteenth Amendment did not entirely remove the need for a di-
rect taxation doctrine. Since the language of the Amendment only exempts "in-
come" taxes from apportionment, the direct tax clauses still retain their effect for
any tax base beyond income. 197 In the absence of another constitutional amend-
ment, only Supreme Court case law can truly wipe out the rule of apportionment.
It did not take the Court long to try.
Just three years after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, in the case
of Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., the Supreme Court issued its clearest statement
rejecting the underlying rationale of Pollock.198 In Stanton, the 1913 income tax
was challenged as imposing a tax on the property of the Baltic Mining Company. 199
The plaintiff argued that since the tax fell on property and not "income," it was a
direct tax and had to be apportioned. 200 The court held that the Sixteenth Amend-
ment applied and thus the tax was constitutional. 20 1 However, the Court took the
opportunity to attack the "tracing principle" of Pollock.20 2 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice White stated that Pollock was based on a "mistaken theory" because
its analysis "tested the tax not by what it was" and focused instead on "the origin or
source of the income taxed.
203
191. See Germain, supra note 23, at 237 (writing, "Beginning in 1909 there was strong support in Congress
for enacting a new broad-based income tax with which to challenge Pollock H head-on").
192. See id. (stating that President Taft proposed the Sixteenth Amendment as a "compromise" that would
allow Congress to tax incomes without having to challenge the Pollock II decision).
193. Germain, supra note 23, at 237.
194. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or
enumeration").
195. Johnson, supra note 14, at 298.
196. Ackerman, supra note 11, at 5.
197. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
198. Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113 (1916).
199. Id. at 107-09.
200. Id. at 109.
201. Id. at 112-14.
202. See id. at 112-13 (stating that a theory that determines whether a tax is direct based on "the origin or
source of the income taxed" is a "mistaken theory"); Ackerman, supra note 11, at 29 (discussing Pollock's ratio-
nale of looking to the source of the tax as being based on a "tracing principle"); Germain, supra note 23, at 242
(providing that Stanton's use of the phrase "mistaken theory" was a "direct assault" on Pollock's underlying ratio-
nale).
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V1. MURPHY V. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: UNEARTHING THE FORGOTTEN
DIRECT TAx CLAUSES
Stanton's rejection of the Pollock rationale did not overrule the case;204 howev-
er, it was the Court's most direct undercutting of Pollock's precedential value. The
Court's patent rejection of the "tracing principle" raises the question of whether
Hylton v. United States should be revived as the better view. Unfortunately, it was
1934 when the Court last addressed the direct tax clauses.2 °5 Despite such confu-
sion over the precedent and over seventy years of silence from the Supreme Court,
the D.C. Circuit decided to apply a direct tax analysis in the 2007 case of Murphy
v. Internal Revenue Service.
206
A. Facts of the Case
The case of Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service began in 1994 when Marrita
Murphy (then Marrita Leveille) filed a complaint with the Department of Labor
alleging that her employer, the New York Air National Guard (NYANG), had, in
her words, "blacklisted" her in violation of certain whistleblower protection sta-
tutes.20 7 Murphy claimed that NYANG had given her unfavorable references to
future employers as a form of retaliation because Murphy alerted state authorities
of environmental hazards on one of NYANG's airbases.2 °8 The Secretary of Labor
"remanded the case to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 'for findings on com-




At her hearing before the ALJ, Murphy claimed that she suffered from "mental
and physical injuries as a result of the NYANG's blacklisting her.9 210 Murphy
presented evidence that showed NYANG's discriminatory and retaliatory conduct,
which caused her to experience "'somatic' and 'emotional' injuries," as well as
"physical" injuries such as teeth grinding, anxiety attacks, dizziness, and shortness
of breath.211 The ALJ awarded $45,000 for emotional distress and $25,000 for
reputational injuries.2 12 In 1999, the Administrative Review Board of the Depart-
ment of Labor upheld the ALJ's award.21 3
The event that gave rise to Murphy's case against the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) arose in 2000 when Murphy filed her income tax return.2 14 In her 2000 fil-
ing, Murphy strictly obeyed Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) and
included her $70,000 damages from her case against NYANG as part of her "gross
204. See Germain, supra note 23, at 242 (stating that "Pollock... was not overruled in Stanton.... ").
205. Jensen, supra note 32, at 160.
206. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy 1), 493 F.3d 170, 180-86 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
207. Id. at 171-72.






214. Murphy 1, 493 F.3d at 172.
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income. '' 215 However, Murphy later filed for a refund of the taxable portion of her
$70,000 under Section 104(a)(2) of the IRC.216 Section 104(a)(2) provides that
"gross income does not include... damages... received.., on account of person-
al physical injuries or sickness., 217 The IRS rejected Murphy's refund claim on the
grounds that her damages were not "physical" damages that resulted from either
"physical injuries" or "physical sickness., 218 Murphy's disagreement with the IRS
led her to file suit in district court.
2 19
Murphy's complaint stated that she was entitled to a refund of the $20,665,
which was the amount of income tax she paid on her $70,000 award, because her
damages against NYANG were for "physical personal injuries.,, 220 Alternatively,
Murphy argued that any tax on the $70,000 award was unconstitutional because
"the award was not 'income' within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment."
221
The district court disagreed with both of Murphy's arguments and eventually
granted summary judgment for both the IRS and the government.222 Murphy con-
sequently appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit.
223
B. The Initial D.C. Circuit Holding
The D.C. Circuit held that Murphy was not entitled to an exemption under Sec-
tion 104(a)(2) of the IRC because her damages award was for "mental pain and
anguish" and "professional reputation" rather than "physical injury. 224 The court
stated that the Board's award "left no room for doubt about the grounds for her
award" because the Board specifically stated that the award was only "for mental
pain and anguish" and "for injury to professional reputation., 225 Based on these
explicit statements, the court held that Murphy's damages were not the sort of
"physical" injuries that are exempt from gross income under Section 104(a)(2).226
However, despite its ruling on Section 104(a)(2), the D.C. Circuit held that
taxation of Murphy's award was unconstitutional under the Sixteenth Amend-
ment.227 The court's Sixteenth Amendment analysis was laden with citations and
discussion relating to Supreme Court precedent on the definition of income, legis-
lative history on the drafting and adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, and even
the work of Nobel Prize winning economist Gary S. Becker. 228 The court con-
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006); Murphy I, 493 F.3d at 172.




222. Id. at 172-73
223. Id. at 173.
224. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy 11), 460 F.3d 79, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d
170 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 92.
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cluded its extensive analysis by writing, "In sum every indication is that damages
received solely in compensation for a personal injury are not income within the
meaning of that term in the Sixteenth Amendment., 2 9 The government sought en
banc review of the case and argued, for the first time, the following: "[E]ven if
Murphy's award is not income, there is no constitutional impediment to taxing it
because a tax on the award is not a direct tax .. " The D.C. Circuit vacated its
judgment and decided to rehear the case anew.
C. The Second, and Final, D.C. Circuit Holding
On rehearing, the D.C. Circuit ruled against Murphy on three separate grounds.
The court held that (1) Murphy's award was still not based on "personal physical
injuries" under Section 104(a)(2) of the IRC, (2) Murphy's award was properly
taxable as "gross income" under Section 61 of the IRC, and (3) the tax placed on
Murphy's award was constitutional as an excise tax and not a direct tax.23  The
court's third holding was reached after a full analysis of whether a tax on Murphy's
award was a "direct tax" under the U.S. Constitution.232 An analysis of the court's
third holding on "direct tax" will be the focus of the remainder of this Note.
D. A Critical Analysis of Murphy's Direct Tax Analysis
The court uses a three-step analysis to reach Murphy's excise tax holding: (1)
the court attempts to clearly define "direct tax," (2) the court outlines Murphy's
arguments on the definition of direct tax and rejects them all, and (3) the court out-
lines the government's arguments on the definition of direct taxation and rejects
them all.233 Only when the court has discarded all the parties' arguments on direct
taxation does it move to an entirely new analysis-an excise tax analysis. 234 The
court's approach is unclear, contradictory, and entirely unhelpful.
1. The Court's Confusing Definition of Direct Tax
From the start, the court's opinion is perplexing. The court begins by laying
out what is "definitely known" about direct taxes.235 The court states, "Only three
taxes are definitely known to be direct (1) a capitation, (2) a tax upon real property,
229. Id. at 92.
230. Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy 1), 493 F.3d 170, 173 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
Why did the court vacate the decision? The court supports its decision as follows: "In view of the importance of
the [direct tax] issue thus belatedly raised, the panel sua sponte vacated its judgment and reheard the case." Id.
However, it is worth noting that the court's decision came under heavy criticism. See, e.g., Germain, supra note
23, at 187, 187 n.4 (stating that the Murphy decision "caused an uproar in the tax community" and citing various
news articles and tax professor blogs that criticized the court's decision).
231. Murphyl, 493 F.3d at 186.
232. See id at 180-86 (analyzing the facts of the case under the heading "The Congress's Power to Tax" and
applying a direct tax analysis).
233. Id.
234. See id. at 181-85 (addressing both side's direct tax arguments in turn before applying an excise tax
analysis).
235. Id. at 181.
24
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and (3) a tax upon personal property." 236 As support for this concise listing of the
"known" direct taxes, the court cites, among other cases, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. 2 37 However, in a footnote, the court completely erodes its own cita-
tion.238 Despite the fact that Murphy's text states a personal property tax is a "defi-
nitely known" direct tax, the court's footnote provides, "Whether that portion of
Pollock remains good law is unclear., 239 Thus, in the D.C. Circuit's view of direct
taxation, the "definitively known" still remains unknown.
2. Murphy's Arguments: The Court Rejects Originalism with Precedent
In the second part of its analysis, the court applies stare decisis to strike down a
major originalist interpretation of the direct tax clauses. After its confusing list of
the "definitely known" direct taxes, the court addresses each party's view on the
meaning of direct taxation. 240 The court analyzes Murphy's position first.241 Mur-
phy argued that direct taxation is determined based on the "incidence of the tax"-
if the tax cannot be avoided, such as a business passing a tax on to a consumer via
higher priced goods, then it is a direct tax.242 Citing to Alexander Hamilton,24 3
Albert Gallatin,244 and Professor Jensen 245 (who also argues that tax incidence was
the original understanding of direct tax),246 Murphy states that her definition "was
the distinction drawn when the Constitution was ratified. ,
247
The court entirely ignores Murphy's originalist perspective and brings down
248the hammer of stare decisis. First, the court rejects Murphy's tax incidence defi-
nition because it conflicts with the court's prior cases on excise taxation. 249 The
court writes that many excise taxes, such as the estate tax, cannot be shifted to
someone else, but yet the court has never held any of these taxes were direct tax-
es. 21 Second, the court rejects Murphy's incidence argument because the prior
case of Knowlton v. United States expressly rejected the idea that tax incidence was
the core defining factor of direct taxation.251 The court wrote that Knowlton, a
post-Pollock case decided in 1900, rejected the idea that "ability to shift" was "the
hallmark of a direct tax."
252
236. Id. (citations omitted and emphasis added).
237. Id.
238. See id. at 181 n.** (stating, "Pollock. . .held that a tax upon the income of real or personal property is
a direct tax. Whether that portion of Pollock remains good law is unclear") (citations omitted).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 181-84.
241. Id. at 181-82.
242. Id. at 181.
243. Id. at 182.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
247. Murphy 1, 493 F.3d at 181.
248. See id. at 184 (addressing Murphy's direct taxation arguments while failing to address her originalism
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3. The Government's Arguments: The Court Rejects Originalism and
Distorts Precedent
Finally, in the last prong of its analysis, the court discusses the government's
arguments on the meaning of direct taxation.253 One would assume that, after en-
tirely rejecting Murphy's view of direct taxation, the court would instead adopt the
government's view. However, the court again uses stare decisis to strike down
another originalist interpretation of direct taxation.254 The government argued that
direct taxes were originally understood as the "only 'taxes that are capable of ap-
portionment ... specifically, capitation taxes and taxes on land.", 255 The govern-
ment asserts that the intent of the Constitution was to give Congress unlimited tax-
ing power because the Continental Congress lacked the ability to raise revenue
under the preexisting Articles of Confederation. 256  Therefore, according to the
government, "the Framers could not have intended to give Congress plenary taxing
power, on the one hand, and then so limit that power by requiring apportionment
for a broad category of taxes, on the other.,
257
In order to support its originalist interpretation of the clauses, the government
cites to Hylton v. United States.258 Hylton held, in part, that direct taxes are only
those that can be reasonably apportioned. 259 The government argued that this hold-
ing supports its originalist interpretation because (1) Hylton is directly on point
with the government's interpretation, and (2) Hylton was rendered almost contem-
poraneously with the ratification of the Constitution.
260
Just as it did to Murphy, the court rejected every argument put forward by the
government, and instead moved on to an excise tax analysis. 261 The court cast
aside all of the government's arguments with a confusing application of stare deci-
sis. First, the court rejected the government's originalism argument that direct tax-
es are "only those capable of satisfying the constraint of apportionment" because,
"[i]n the abstract, such a constraint is no constraint at all., 262  This conclusion by
the court is problematic for two reasons: (1) the court uses common sense to fully
reject one of the major holdings of the Hylton case, and (2) the court supported its
conclusion by citing to Pollock-the very case that the court stated was questiona-
ble law a mere three pages earlier.263
253. Murphy 1, 493 F.3d at 182-84.
254. See id. (outlining the government's originalist interpretation of direct taxation based on the work of
Professor Calvin H. Johnson but analyzing the government's arguments by applying stare decisis and failing to
address the originalist interpretation).
255. Murphyl, 493 F.3d at 182.
256. Id. at 182-83.
257. Id. at 183.
258. Id.
259. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796).
260. Murphy 1, 493 F.3d at 183.
261. See id. at 184 (failing to address the government's originalism argument and choosing instead to apply
stare decisis, and then moving on to consider the tax under an excise analysis).
262. Murphy1, 493 F.3d at 184.
263. See id. (citing Pollock to reject the government's position).
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Second, the court refused to accept the government's interpretation of direct
taxation because it conflicted with the long-held view that land taxes are direct
taxes.264 The court pointed out that a land tax is "widely understood to be a direct
tax. '265 In addition, the court stated that it would be difficult to apportion a tax on
land throughout the United States because it would require "imposing significantly
non-uniform rates." 266 Thus, the court concluded that the government's definition
of "direct tax" as a tax "capable of satisfying apportionment" was erroneous be-
cause a well-known direct tax, such as a land tax, would be extremely difficult to
267apportion.
The court's analysis here, once again, contorts Supreme Court precedent. Hyl-
ton directly holds that which Murphy rejects. Justice Chase's opinion in Hylton, as
described above, stated the precise conclusion that Murphy finds so illogical.268
Specifically, Justice Chase wrote that direct taxes are only those that can "reasona-
bly" be apportioned. 269 However, just a few paragraphs later, he also stated, "the
direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are only two, to wit, a capitation...
and a tax on LAND., 270 Therefore, Murphy's rejection of the government's posi-
tion directly contradicts the opinion of Justice Chase. Moreover, Murphy's support
for rejecting the government's argument is a citation to the Hylton case itself-but
it is a citation to Justice Paterson's opinion.2 71 Thus, following in its continual pat-
tern of mangling stare decisis, not only does Murphy reject two of the main conclu-
sions of Hylton, but it cites a separate member of the Hylton Court to support doing
SO.
VII. MURPHY HAS TAXNAPPED AND IT MUST BE STOPPED
A. Murphy's Taxnapping
The Murphy decision is "taxnapping" in its purest form. The court's direct tax
analysis meets all three of the taxnapping prerequisites. As outlined above, the
three prerequisites for taxnapping are: (1) a tax case must be before the court, (2)
the court's decision must have the potential to alter tax policy, and (3) the court's
opinion must leave the tax law ambiguous.
First, and most obviously, Murphy's application of a direct tax analysis means
that Murphy is a tax case.2 72 Second, the decision does have the potential to impact
tax policy. Despite the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, the direct tax clauses




268. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (Chase, J.) (stating, "The rule of appor-
tionment is only to be adopted in such cases where it can reasonably apply").
269. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 174.
270. Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
271. See Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy 1), 493 F.3d 170, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing Hyl-
ton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175-81 (Paterson, J., concurring) (rejecting the government's position).
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still restrain Congress's power to tax if such taxes are not based on "income.,
273
Nearly all of the current proposals to reform the federal income tax are "consump-
tion" taxes and not "income" taxes,7 arguably making the Sixteenth Amendment
inapplicable.275 There are three main types of consumption taxes and each major
reform proposal fits into each category. The three forms of consumption taxes are:
(1) an "expenditure tax" imposed on "total consumption expenditures, 276 which
includes the flat tax, Fair Tax, and the USA tax; 277 (2) a "sales tax" imposed on
"sales of goods and services;, 278 and (3) a "value-added tax" imposed on "the dif-
ference between a firm's sales and its purchases., 27 9 If any of these major "con-
sumption" taxes became law, then the meaning of the direct tax clauses would be-
come extremely important. In fact, although some disagree, 280 Professor Erik Jen-
sen has argued that the flat tax and the USA tax are unconstitutional direct taxes
because "[t]he tax liability falls directly on individuals.
281
Finally, Murphy's direct tax analysis meets the third element of taxnapping be-
cause it leaves the case law on direct taxation ambiguous. At the conclusion of
Murphy's bewildering direct tax analysis, it is difficult to determine if anything-
282or everything-remains of the case law interpreting the direct tax clauses. Mur-
phy rejects two of the three major opinions in Hylton v. United States, 283 leaving
only Justice Paterson's interpretation intact.284 In addition, Murphy questions
whether Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. remains good law while simulta-
273. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (providing that "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes.., without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration");
Germain, supra note 23, at 240 (stating, "The Sixteenth Amendment did not, however, eliminate the apportion-
ment requirement entirely. The apportionment requirement remains for direct taxes that are not income taxes...
.1).
274. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 2402-09 (describing the retail sales tax, value-added tax, flat tax, and
USA tax as "consumption taxes"); Snyder & Gallegos, supra note 48, at 8-18 (describing the flat tax, USA tax,
and value-added tax as all "consumption" taxes).
275. See generally Jensen, supra note 19 (discussing how the Sixteenth Amendment's "taxes on incomes"
provision should be interpreted).
276. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 183 (4th ed. 1983).
277. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 2403 (describing how the flat tax and USA tax are levied against expendi-
tures because both taxes "would effectively remove savings from the tax base" and "tax only consumption");
NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER, THE FAiRTAX BOOK: SAYING GOODBYE TO THE INCOME TAX AND THE IRS 75
(2005) (stating that the FairTax would be a "single-rate personal consumption tax"). Please note that it is also
possible to classify the FairTax as a hybrid consumption-sales tax because it is defined as not just "single-rate
personal consumption tax," but also a "simple sales tax" on goods and services. NEAL BOORTZ & JOHN LINDER,
THE FAIRTAX BOOK: SAYING GOODBYE TO THE INCOME TAX AND THE IRS 75 (2005)
278. PECHMAN, supra note 276, at 183.
279. Id.
280. See generally Johnson, supra note 14 (disagreeing with Professor Jensen's conclusion that some of the
major consumption tax reforms are unconstitutional direct taxes).
281. Jensen, supra note 15, at 2407.
282. See supra notes 234-70 and accompanying text.
283. See Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy 1), 493 F.3d 170, 184 (rejecting the argument that
direct taxes are "only those capable of satisfying the constraint of apportionment"); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 171, 174, 181 (showing that two of the three Justices that wrote substantive opinions, Justice Chase and
Justice Iredell, believed that direct taxes were only those capable of being apportioned).
284. Justice Paterson's opinion outlined two interpretations of the direct tax clauses. First, Justice Paterson
wrote that direct taxes come in at least two forms, capitation taxes and land taxes. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176-
77. Second, Justice Paterson stated that the direct tax clauses should not be "extended by construction" because
the clauses arose out of a slavery compromise. Id. at 178.
28
Barry Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 2
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol12/iss1/2
Spring 2009
285neously citing the case for support. Murphy leaves a little something for every-
one. Attorneys may cite to Murphy's rejection of nearly every Hylton opinion to
show that Pollock's broad reading of the clauses is the better rule. However, advo-
cates of Hylton's narrow reading of the clauses can use Murphy's footnote to show
that Pollock may no longer be good law.
With all three taxnapping prerequisites met, Murphy makes it possible for the
judiciary to decide the future of tax reform. The fact that scholars continue to de-
bate whether a flat tax or USA tax is an unconstitutional direct tax shows that there
is room for argument in future litigation.286 The policy debate over tax reform is
complex and multifaceted.287 To decide which plan is best, it will take much more
than a mere consideration of legal rules.288 Therefore, the proper forum for choos-
ing a tax reform plan is the legislature and not the judiciary.289 As long as Mur-
phy's direct tax analysis remains good law, the D.C. Circuit will become the na-
tion's top home-field advantage for tax reform protestors. All who object to tax
reform based on a consumption tax model may use Murphy's confusing analysis to
their favor; in particular, they can suggest that the court's rejection of Hylton
means that the expansive Pollock interpretation is best.29°
B. A "Supreme" Corrective
The United States Supreme Court must repair Murphy's taxnapping. Although
the Murphy court botched its application of stare decisis, the court can be forgiven
for failing to glean a clear rule from over 200 years of bewildering precedent. The
Supreme Court's case law on the direct tax clauses has allowed the narrow reading
of Hylton, the broad reading of Pollock, and Stanton's rejection of Pollock's ratio-
nale to exist simultaneously. 291 By granting certiorari in Murphy, the Court can
finally clarify the case law and prevent taxnapping.292 There are two ways that the
Court can do this, and they can be used alternatively: (1) the Court can eliminate
the effect of the clauses by adopting Hylton as the preferred interpretation, or (2)
the Court can give effect to the clauses but set out a clear rule based on originalism.
285. Murphy 1, 493 F.3d at 181; see supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
286. Compare Jensen, supra note 15, at 2407-08 (arguing that the flat tax and the USA tax are "direct"
taxes and that they will have to be apportioned), with Zelenak, supra note 49, at 837-45, 855 (critiquing Jensen's
argument that the flat tax and USA are "direct" taxes and concluding that some of Jensen's distinctions "make no
sense (or are even perverse) ....1").
287. AARON & GALE, supra note 40, at 8-11 (providing a four-page chart of the characteristics of each
major tax reform proposal).
288. See id. at 6-14 (outlining and critiquing the various tax reform proposals based on criteria such as
fairness to lower-income taxpayers and overall economic efficiency).
289. See TARR, supra note 2, at 299 (summarizing "well-known" judicial policymaking critic, Donald
Horowitz, as asserting that courts are poor policymakers because courts decide cases based on "legal considera-
tions rather than on the desirability of a policy or the likely consequences of alternative approaches to a problem").
290. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 118-202 and accompanying text.
292. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy 1), 493 F.3d 170 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (No. 07-802); Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy
1), 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 07-802). The government just filed its "Brief for the Respondents in Oppo-
sition" in March 2008. See Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Murphy v. Internal Revenue Service (Murphy
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First, the Supreme Court can thwart Murphy's taxnapping by choosing Hyl-
ton's narrow reading as the best interpretation of the direct tax clauses. To do this,
the Court should expressly adopt Justice Chase's view in Hylton that direct taxes
are only those that can be reasonably apportioned.293  Under this reading, the direct
tax clauses would be read out of the Constitution. For example, Article I, Section 2
would read, "Representatives and reasonably apportionable taxes shall be appor-
tioned.' '294 This circular reading would end the limiting effect of the clauses, and
also ensure the end of taxnapping, because it would not be possible for Congress to
pass a "reasonably apportionable" tax that cannot be apportioned.295
Although some may object to this reading as violating the rule against surplu-
sage,296 the Court can support its determination with the original understanding of
"direct tax" from the dictionary of 1787. Under the 1787 dictionary, direct taxes
were a synonym for "apportioned taxes., 297 Therefore, although the Court may be
diminishing the effect of the clauses, the validation lies in originalism. 298 It should
be noted that there is another method the Court may use in order to give no effect
to the clauses: the court may refuse to apply the clauses because they were rooted
in slavery. 299 However, this approach is inappropriate because various parts of the
Constitution arose from slavery compromises.300 Applying the slavery reading to
the direct tax clauses would set a problematic precedent for other constitutional
301provisions.
Second, the Court can prevent Murphy's taxnapping by using originalism to set
a clear rule on direct taxation. A clear constitutional rule will preclude taxnapping
by ensuring that courts are hearing constitutional law arguments instead of veiled
293. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (Chase, J.) (stating, "The rule of appor-
tionment is only to be adopted in such cases where it can reasonably apply").
294. See Jensen, supra note 15, at 2354 (discussing, within the context ofHylton v. United States, the circu-
lar nature of the idea that "only those [taxes] that can be practically apportioned" are direct taxes).
295. A happy consequence of this approach is that the rule of apportionment would forever be prevented
from operating and creating inequitable results.
296. See Jensen, supra note 19, at 366 (stating that any interpretation of the direct tax clauses should give
effect to the clauses "in [their] most robust form" and "[i]f your method of interpretation leads you to conclude
that a provision is nonsensical.., the appropriate response is to reconsider the method ... ").
297. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 314 (stating, under the heading "The 1787 Dictionary Meaning of 'Di-
rect Tax,"' that a "well-constructed dictionary at the time of the Constitution" would define "direct tax" as "a
synonym for apportioned tax").
298. The dictionary of 1787 is a particularly useful tool for applying originalism. Justice Scalia has stated,
"What I look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the original meaning of the text, not
what the original draftsmen intended." Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (1997). Since a dictionary is based on the common usage of various words
at the time it was written, the dictionary of 1787 serves as a solid basis for the Court to ground its adoption of the
Hylton reading of the direct tax clauses. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 314 (stating, "Dictionaries were con-
structed in 1787, as they are now, through a broad sampling of word usage").
299. See Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 171, 177-78 (Paterson, J.) (stating that the direct tax claus-
es "ought not to be extended by construction" due to their connection to slavery).
300. See Jensen, supra note 19, at 376 (stating that eliminating the effect of the direct tax clauses simply
because they are connected with slavery "would expose the Constitution to a seemingly endless series of chal-
lenges" because, as Jensen writes, "Where do we stop if we start unraveling the compromises that had some argu-
able connection with slavery?").
301. Id.
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public policy.30 2 The best originalist interpretation for the Court to adopt is Profes-
sor Jensen's avoidance definition, which provides that direct taxes are those that
cannot be avoided by the taxpayer.30 3 For example, a national sales tax is indirect
because a taxpayer can refuse to purchase the good or service, and a land tax is
direct because it is levied on the property the taxpayer currently owns.3°4 By
adopting this rule and giving effect to the clauses, the Court will not violate the rule
against surplusage. Moreover, since the avoidance definition is based on original-
ism, it may eliminate the confusion over whether Hylton or Pollock is the better
rule.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit's direct tax analysis in Murphy was a mistake.30 5 The court's
convoluted analysis creates problems that extend far beyond the taxation of an
award for emotional damages.3° Murphy may allow the judiciary to determine the
direction of fundamental tax reform-an act first defined in this article as "taxnap-
ping." As the United States contemplates various proposals to reform the federal
income tax, Murphy stands as an open door to all those in opposition. In order to
make sure the legislature determines tax policy, the meaning of direct taxation
must be clarified. The United States Supreme Court has been silent on the issue for
over 70 years.307 The inappropriate and undemocratic effects of taxnapping must
spur the Court into action. By granting certiorari in Murphy, and finally clarifying
the meaning of direct taxation, the Court can make certain that tax policy remains
in the hands of the legislature.
302. Taxnapping is prevented by a clear rule because the third prerequisite for taxnapping cannot be met.
For there to be a risk that tax policy protestors will run to the courts, the law must be susceptible to arguments that
favor both sides of the debate. An unambiguous rule makes this extremely difficult.
303. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
304. Id.
305. See supra notes 232-270 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 271-89 and accompanying text.
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